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J Mapuva and L Muyengwa 
1 Introduction 
 
The paper seeks to show the extent to which key legislative provisions have curtailed 
civil liberties, contrary to the constitutional provisions which seek in theory to 
promote civil liberties, human rights and citizens' participation in governance.1 
Additionally the paper highlights the gravity of the gross breach of legal provisions 
that are meant to promote human and civil rights. In addressing these aims the 
paper responds to the question: 
 
To what extent have legal provisions provided for the protection and sustenance of 
human rights, civil liberties and citizens' participation in governance processes in 
Zimbabwe over the last two decades? 
 
Zimbabwe is a country in the Southern African region and achieved political 
independence from Britain in 1980 amid much fanfare and pomp, as citizens were 
promised civil liberties by their political leadership. The constitution adopted then, the 
Lancaster House Constitution, was a proud document that articulated the civil 
liberties that people of the country had craved for, over the decades of colonial rule. 
The post-colonial state undertook several reforms that ranged from gender, 
constitutional, agrarian to electoral issues, seeking to respond to citizens' demands 
for the development of an egalitarian society in the country.2 However, rampant 
corruption, the taking of arbitrary decisions by the ruling party, ZANU PF, and the 
commission of gross human rights violations resulted in a gradual disconnection 
between the ruling elite and the general citizenry. Increased demands for further 
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reforms saw the emergence of a pro-democracy civil society movement that sought 
to engage the state towards the realisation of and respect for civil liberties.3 Poor 
economic and political policy implementation increased ZANU PF's unpopularity 
among the electorate, as evidenced by the party's deteriorating performance in 
various elections, especially from the mid-1990s, when it became increasingly 
evident that democracy was under threat.4 This activated pro-democracy 
organisations that sought to restore the nation's disintegrating democratic 
institutions.5 Most of Zimbabwe's political woes emanated from skewed policy 
implementation against the backdrop of the ongoing rule of an increasingly despotic 
and desperate regime that utilised its mandate to govern by promulgating and 
enacting restrictive legislation to disenfranchise previously eligible members of 
society, by curtailing civil liberties, and by perpetuating gross human rights 
violations.6 As a result several political and economic developments occurred as the 
regime fought for its political survival.7 Consequently, successive and partisan 
constitutional amendments sought to legitimise controversial actions, notably the 
expropriation of land in terms of the Land Acquisition Act (1985), which violated 
property rights.8 Partisan constitutional amendments or new legal enactments made 
to the legislative environment in the country from 2000 involved the Private and 
Voluntary Organisations Act (PVO) of 1996; the Broadcast Services Act of 2000; the 
Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection 
of Privacy Act (AIPPA),9 both enacted in 2002; the NGO Bill of 2004; the Zimbabwe 
Electoral Act of 2006; and the Interception of Communications Act of 2007. 
Consequently, these are some of the legal instruments that will form the objects of 
this critique. These pieces of legislation were implemented in the context of a country 
with a restless citizenry that demanded the restoration of the civil liberties that had 
gradually been eroded as the regime clung to power through whatever means 
possible.10 
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2 The background to the restrictive legislation 
 
It has been noted that Zimbabwe has experienced tumultuous and unprecedented 
political, economic and social developments in the last two decades.11 These 
developments have seen the enactment of new legislation and/or the amendment of 
existing legislation in order to facilitate the militarisation and politicisation of public 
institutions to the detriment of the civilian population of the country12. These 
constitutional developments showed the extent to which the political dispensation 
was striving for political survival against the backdrop of an increasingly restive 
population which was responding to the decay of democracy that characterised 
political developments from the mid-1990s.13 The rise of a pro-democracy civil 
society movement in the country was in response to deteriorating democracy. Public 
participation in any facet of life became guided by partisan pieces of legislation that 
prescribe certain anticipated behaviours from the general populace.14 Over the 
years, laws have been put in place to protect citizens, but in time these laws were 
amended to curtail human rights and hurt the very people that they were intended to 
protect. 
 
To understand why the government reneged on its wartime promises of creating a 
free society for its people, one needs to reflect on recent developments,15 starting 
with the growth in prominence of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) 
and the subsequent formation of a broad-based opposition political party, the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The popularity of the MDC is reflected by 
the fact that it commands a lot of support from almost the whole spectrum of civil 
society, ranging from labour and student movements, religious groups, and 
independent media houses.16 Additionally, it has been able to amass the most 
electoral support since 2000, which has given rise to electoral disputes with ZANU 
PF. The MDC has performed impressively in municipal and parliamentary elections 
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and has dominated most local authorities in the country. The success of civil society 
in mobilising citizens17 to reject the endorsement of the government-sponsored Draft 
Constitution in a referendum in 1999 dealt a heavy political blow to the ZANU PF 
government and exposed the illegal manner in which the government had dealt with 
the issue of constitutional reform. The results of the Referendum also indicated that 
civil society had a stronger voice than the state. The "farm invasions" that came hard 
on the heels of the formation of the MDC and the results of the Referendum were 
acts of revenge against white commercial farmers who had bank-rolled the formation 
of the MDC and had also influenced farm workers to vote against government's 
intended endorsement of the Draft Constitution. The government began to perceive 
the white commercial farmers, civil society and the MDC as "enemies of the people," 
who should be disempowered by uprooting them from their sources of livelihood, in 
this case, their farms.18 To the government, Britain, the former colonial master, was 
behind the funding of the opposition political parties and various civic groups in order 
to effect regime change. 
 
The unfolding of the above events led government to adopt a hostile view of civil 
society groups, Britain and its western allies, as well as opposition political parties, 
especially the MDC. The pretext for the attempt to bring civil societies into the sphere 
of the state is often given as their inept financial mismanagement, their lack of 
control of their funds.19 But the reality behind the attempts is the government's fear of 
the potential NGOs have for organising people outside state structures, and also the 
change in donor policies, which now emphasise the building of the institutions of civil 
society, so that NGOs now receive funds which earlier would have gone to 
government projects.20 Thus civil society can be seen to be in direct competition with 
government over donor funds21. New legislation and the amendment of existing laws 
reflects vindictiveness on the part of government towards NGOs, for the laws are 
now geared at restricting citizens' participation in governance and policy 
                                                          
17  Keulder State, Society and Democracy 17. 
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18    Mapuva 2010 Journal of Legislative Studies 463. 
19  Stephenson 2005 www.beyondintractability.org. Also see Raftopoulos and Phimister Keep on 
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processes.22 While the laws should protect the populace, in this context the 
amendments to key  existing laws and the enactment of new laws have provided 
government with tools with which it can deal with the perceived "enemies of the 
state" and the proponents of "regime change." 
 
This paper mainly deals with legal enactments and amendments that took effect 
soon after the formation of the MDC, which was the result of a concerted effort by 
the generality of the Zimbabwean citizenry, and was achieved mainly through civil 
society organisations (CSOs). This is so because the formation of the MDC reflected 
the extent of citizens' participation and the new political formation enjoyed broad 
support. The following are the key legislative framework that this paper attempts to 
critique and how the content of these pieces of legislation reflected the existence of 
an authoritarian state. 
 
2.1 The Constitution of Zimbabwe (1979) 
 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. All national legislation emanates 
from and should conform to it.23 Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003) note that "...the 
formal constitution of the state should in principle provide the ultimate legal 
framework through which rational-legal behaviour is defined and is not to be used as 
a punitive measure against citizens."24 However "constitutions lay down the overall 
nature and the characteristics of political institutions in elaborate detail, and hold 
promises of institutionally guaranteed civil liberties and political democracy".25 
Constitutional provisions include civil and political rights, which all citizens are 
entitled to, irrespective of religion, colour or political affiliation.26 Through registering 
and allowing the institutions of civil society a continued existence, the state is 
creating an avenue for civil participation in national programmes that help in realising 
societal objectives such as poverty alleviation, the observance of human rights, the 
upholding of democratic principles, and even environmental and HIV/AIDS 
                                                          
22  Bidi "Multi-party democracy in Zimbabwe" 6. 
 
23  Mapuva Role of Civil Society 27. 
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awareness campaigns.27 The opposite of this would be constitutions that "are tailor-
made to fulfil specific political purposes and to present a mere cloak of legitimacy to 
norms and practices otherwise the considered as unpopular and illegitimate".28 In the 
Zimbabwean context this is exemplified in the Constitutional Amendment 17 of 
2006,29 which authenticated the expropriation of formerly white-owned commercial 
farms without taking cognisance of property rights that the then owners had over 
their properties. From 2002, several pieces of legislation of the same nature and 
sophistication were enacted to fulfil specific political ambitions.30 The Constitution 
realised this political motive through legal provisions such as Acts and Bills, some of 
which are identified below: 
 
2.2  The Private Voluntary Organisations (PVO) Act31  
 
The Private and Voluntary Organisations Act (PVO) of 1996 requires all 
organisations that provide welfare services or treatment or "any activities that uplift 
the standard of living of persons or families" to register with the government32. 
Registration is not automatic, and the government has a right to deny an 
organisation's right to exist after examining the organisation's financial books and 
records. Until recently this last provision had not been enforced, but from November 
2002 government required that all organisations not registered under the PVO Act 
should immediately cease operations or face arrest. Under the PVO Act the Minister 
                                                          
27  Mapuva Role of Civil Society 46. 
28  Meerkotter 2012 www.kubatana.net. 
29  Land (Consequential Provisions) Bill 2006, under the proviso to section 5(1) of the Land 
Acquisition Act [Chapter 20:10],  and which is itemised in Schedule 7, being agricultural land 
required for resettlement purposes. 
30  Public Order and Security Act 2002, seeking to curtail civil liberties and the freedoms of 
movement, expression and assembly, eg Part II regards the following as offences against 
constitutional government and public security:  causing disaffection among members of the 
Police Force or Defence Force (s 12); publishing or communicating false statements prejudicial 
to the State (s 15); undermining the authority of or insulting the President (s 16). Part III regards 
the following as offences against public order: gatherings conducive to riot, disorder or 
intolerance (s. 19); assaulting or resisting a police officer (s. 20); undermining police authority (s. 
21); intimidation (s. 22). Part IV sets the procedure that needs to be followed in order to be 
allowed to have a public gathering: organisers are to notify the regulating authority of their 
intention to hold a public gathering (s. 24); regulation of public gatherings (s. 25); prohibition of 
public gatherings to avoid public disorder (s. 26); temporary prohibition of the holding of public 
demonstrations within particular police districts (s. 27); civil liability in certain circumstances of 
organiser of public gathering (s. 28); dispersal of unlawful public gatherings (s. 29); disrupting 
public gatherings (s. 31). 
31  World Bank Governance 4. 
32  Private Voluntary Organisations Act 1996 [Chapter 17:05] General Notice 99 of 2007. 
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of Public Service is tasked to oversee the registration/deregistration of civic and 
private/voluntary organisations and their compliance with the various sections of the 
Act. The Act allows for the formation of a civil society umbrella body, the National 
Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO), to oversee the running 
of all civic organisations, under the strict supervision of the Minister of Public 
Service.33 However, the Minister of Public Service is involved in the appointment of 
Board members; an issue that civil society has said undermines the autonomy of the 
whole spectrum of civil society and compromises their decision-making processes. 
The PVO Act makes specific reference to and enunciates reservations about foreign 
funding to civic groups, with the latest amendment to the Act34 banning all foreign 
funding to civic organisations. NGOs have reportedly expressed concern about the 
amendment of the Act since it "signalled the eagerness of the state to control the 
growing NGO sector and, in particular, the funding being channelled into these 
organisations at a time when its political legitimacy was being undermined by a 
growing economic crisis".35 
 
2.3  Urban Councils Act (1996) 
 
The World Bank (2007:195) argues that "local government has the power to manage 
its own fiscal revenues and expenditures, subject to national framework conditions." 
On the effectiveness of local government institutions, it suggests that local 
government institutions are "a desired and natural outgrowth of trends towards fiscal 
decentralization, intended to reduce central [government] control in favour of local 
preferences that foster allocative efficiency."36 An appropriate legal framework 
                                                          
33   NANGO Directory 19. 
34  Private Voluntary Organisations Act 1996 [Chapter 17:05] General Notice 99 of 2007 – Code of 
Procedure for the Registration and Operations of Non-Governmental Organisations in Zimbabwe; 
The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act 2005 (ZEC Act) prohibits the receipt of foreign funding 
for conducting voter education. S 16 provides that "No foreign contribution or donation for the 
purposes of voter education shall be made except to the Commission, which may allocate such 
contribution or donation to any person referred to in section 14(3) or subsection 15(1)". Other 
than this specific prohibition, there are no legal limitations more broadly limiting the ability of 
CSOs to obtain funding from any particular source. 
35  Raftopoulos NGOs, the State and Politics 36. 
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should be "used as a guide to measure progress in promoting administrative 
autonomy, fiscal autonomy, public property rights and decentralization of services".37 
The attainment of political independence in Zimbabwe in 1980 brought with it a 
number of local government constitutional reforms. Through the amendment to the 
Urban Councils Act (1973) in 1996, Chapter 214 of the Act was effected, which 
provided for the decentralisation and democratisation of the Local Government 
system by removing racial discrimination pertaining to representation and tenure in 
urban areas.38 The Urban Councils Act of 1973 had provided for local authorities 
based on racial lines and was highly centralised. The resultant amendment to the Act 
led to the incorporation of former local government areas (African townships) into 
Urban Council areas.39 The democratisation of the Urban Councils also resulted in 
the enfranchisement of rent-paying lodgers, who did not have the vote under the 
colonial Local Government system.40 The decentralisation of the decision-making 
processes from central government to urban councils resulted in increased public 
participation in policy formulation and development.41 However it has been noted that 
"the policy formulation process in Zimbabwe is largely top-down in nature, thereby 
rendering citizen participation in the process a reaction to policy proposals from the 
top".42 The top-down approach practised by some governments has been defended 
by the statement that "government officials are the ones who have the information on 
what resources the central government will make available for the implementation of 
development programmes and projects, so they are justified to make critical 
decisions regarding these programmes and projects if they are to be funded".43 
However, the democratisation of urban councils has been frustrated by "the relatively 
stronger hand from central government which gives the Minister of Local 
Government and Urban Development the right and powers to remove an elected 
Urban Council where it is felt that the elected officials are not in line with people's 
wishes."44  
                                                          
37  Smith 2003 Journal of Public Administration 25. 
38  Chris 1994 Review of African Political Economy 240-307. Also see Wekwete 2000 Public 
Administration and Development 97-110. 
39  Kamrava 2000 Third World Quarterly 13. 
40  Kamrava 2000 Third World Quarterly 13. 
41  Makumbe 1996 Human Rights Bulletin 21-25.  
42  World Bank Governance 4. 
43  Hyden and Braton (eds) Governance and Politics 45. 
44  MLGRUD Report 16.  
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This is an enabling Act of Parliament, which empowers ratepayers in urban areas to 
form residents' associations that would represent ratepayers' interests. These can 
even summon political leadership to address ratepayers on issues affecting them, 
such as the unwarranted hiking of rates, as well as poor service delivery.45 The 
Urban Councils' Act facilitates citizens' participation in the affairs of urban councils 
through involving ratepayers in such civic matters as the design and implementation 
of the budget process. However, through the Act government retains much of the 
decision-making power. The Minister of Local Government is empowered to decide 
on the suitability of an elected Mayor and to dismiss him/her as well as to appoint a 
Commission to run the affairs of a given Town or City.46 This has frustrated residents 
as the Minister of Local Government has the power to overturn public decisions, eg 
dismissing elected mayors and councillors and arbitrarily making personal 
appointments of public officials.47  
 
In April 2008, the Urban Councils' Act was amended to empower the Minister of 
Local Government, Rural and Urban Development to appoint special interest 
councilors for each ward in every urban area,48 thus adding to the normal local 
council complement. This was after the realisation that ZANU PF was performing 
badly in almost all local government elections. To counter the MDC majority in these 
local councils, the Minister would make additional arbitrary appointments, which 
could not exceed 25% of those democratically elected by residents.49 The additional 
hand-picked councillors would enjoy the same benefits as their elected 
counterparts.50 This new legislative provision presented an additional financial 
burden to the already poverty-stricken rate payers. What has further angered 
residents (the electorate) has been cases where losing ZANU PF candidates in the 
same local government elections were appointed by the Minister as special interest 
councillors.51 Additionally, the special interest councillors shall hold office during the 
                                                          
45  Section 152(2) Urban Councils Act 1996 [Chapter 29:15].  
46  Section 152(2) Urban Councils Act 1996 [Chapter 29:15]. 
47  Karimakwenda 2010 www.swradioafrica.com. 
48  Section 4A(1)(a) Zimbabwe Urban Councils' Act 2008. 
49  Section 4A(1)(b) Zimbabwe Urban Councils' Act 2008. 
50  Section 4A(2) Zimbabwe Urban Councils' Act 2008. 
51  Shumba 2010 www.swradioafrica.com. 
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pleasure of the Minister,52 which makes them accountable to the Minister and not to 
the residents who are supposed to foot the bill for the salaries of these appointees. 
This development in urban governance has been viewed by critics as punishing the 
urban electorate for voting for candidates of their choice in local government 
elections.53 Such provisions and the subsequent behaviour of the Minister in 
appointing such councilors is a blatant human rights violation, given that citizens 
have a right to govern themselves through elected representatives.54  
 
2.4  NGO Bill (2004)  
 
The Bill seeks to ban foreign NGOs concerned principally with "issues of 
governance", and NGOs receiving foreign funding for the "promotion and protection 
of human rights and political governance issues" are to be denied registration.55 The 
changing context of state and NGO relationships will be adversely affected, 
especially in cases where international tourism is a revenue generator for both the 
private sector and government.56 Environmental NGOs, which have been carrying 
out feasibility studies on environmental conservation programmes, would also be 
negatively affected and environmental programmes stalled. The bill provides for the 
establishment of a regulatory council that can decide whether a particular NGO will 
be registered or not.57 
 
Meanwhile, NGOs likely to face closure after the law is enacted have said they will 
oppose the enactment of the Bill.58 If the government proceeds with some 
aggressive amendments to the Bill, some humanitarian NGOs such as those working 
to address the needs of disabled persons in Zimbabwe will be affected.59 The 
projected effect on the beneficiaries is of concern, because government alone 
cannot sustain most of these programmes. It needs input from civil society. Even 
                                                          
52  Section 4A(1)(b) Zimbabwe Urban Councils' Act 2008. 
53  Anon 2010 www.zimbabwesituation.org (Ignatius Chombo is the Minister of Local Government in 
Zimbabwe). 
54  Article 21(1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
55  Section 9(4) NGO Bill 2004, cited in Mapuva Role of Civil Society. 
56  Dorman "NGOs and the State in Zimbabwe" 35. 
57  IBA Critical Additions to the NGO Bill 3, cited in Mapuva Role of Civil Society. 
58  Naidoo and Doube 2007 Journal of Civil Society Law 89. 
59  Karimakwenda 2010 www.swradioafrica.com. 
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relations between the Zimbabwe government and many UN agencies will be 
strained, since most poverty-alleviation, environmental and HIV/AIDS programmes 
are being funded by UN agencies.60  
 
2.5  The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) (2002) 
 
POSA, which was passed in January 2002, replaced the Law and Order 
Maintenance Act of 1960 (LOMA), one of the few pieces of legislation retained from 
the Rhodesian era. LOMA generally outlined police powers, state security measures, 
and the limits of personal freedom as they related to state security.61 LOMA was 
considered to be a draconian piece of legislation that served the interests of the 
white minority. Ironically, the Rhodesian regime often invoked this statute to inhibit 
the revolutionary forces and their supporters, who now rule Zimbabwe. Mugabe kept 
LOMA in place after independence mainly due to its effectiveness in suppressing 
dissent against the government.62 The decision to replace LOMA came after years of 
public criticism over its colonial roots and the Mugabe regime's desire to restrict 
opposition to the government beyond the boundaries of LOMA.63 The Act severely 
restricts freedom of assembly and movement, and provides the police with wide 
discretionary powers. 
 
POSA comprises a number of sections which prescribe certain expectations and 
compliances. Sections 19 and 20 of the Act refer to voices of dissent as "offences 
against constitutional government and public security", which include sabotage, acts 
of terrorism, and the possession of dangerous weaponry, as well as undermining the 
authority of or insulting the President.64  
 
According to POSA it is an offence to "cause disaffection among Police Force or 
Defence Force",65 to "publish or communicate false statements prejudicial to the 
                                                          
60    Dorman "NGOs in Zimbabwe" 18. 
61    Legal Resources Foundation 2008 Paralegal Bulletin 2. 
62  Mapuva Role of Civil Society. 
63  Jafari 2003 Human Rights Brief 6-15. 
64  Mashiri 2011 www.zimbabwesituation.com. 
65  Section 12 Public Order and Security Act 2002. 
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State"66 and to "undermine the authority of or insult the President".67 It is not difficult 
to see how these sections can easily be used by the state to silence voices of 
legitimate criticism, despite the fact that freedom of expression is guaranteed in the 
constitution. And indeed they have been used, section 15 especially against 
journalists, and section 16 against both journalists and individuals.68  
 
Part 4 of POSA, entitled "Public Gathering" is most commonly used against 
opposition campaign meetings, including the activities of civil society bodies. 
Sections 24-31 lay down conditions for the holding of public gatherings. Under 
section 24 anyone who wishes to organise a public gathering must notify the police 
four days in advance. Under section 25 the police are authorised to place restrictions 
on the gathering or prohibit it entirely as stipulated under section 26 if they have 
"reasonable grounds for believing" the gathering will result in public disorder, a 
breach of the peace, or obstruction of any thoroughfare. These provisions are 
regularly misunderstood or deliberately misapplied by the police. The organisers of a 
gathering are required to "notify" the police; the section does not state that the police 
must "give permission". Having been notified the police then have the power to 
prohibit the event, but only on the specified grounds. If no prohibition is made by the 
responsible authority, then the law is that the gathering is not prohibited and may 
proceed.69 The excuses given by the police for prohibiting gatherings are entirely 
flimsy. They have even been known to claim that the responsible authority is not 
available. Other reasons have been that ZANU PF has booked the same venue, or 
that the gathering is likely to provoke disorder. Where disorder has been caused on 
a previous occasion by ZANU PF militias, trumped-up charges are laid against other 
political parties, especially the MDC. The other sections of Part IV provide for 
general prohibitions on all gatherings in a specific district, for the civil liability of the 
organiser of gatherings for any damage caused, the dispersal of unlawful gatherings, 
and the prohibition of the carrying of weapons at gatherings, which by definition 
includes "any stone". In practice it is not surprising that ZANU PF gatherings are 
                                                          
66  Section 15 Public Order and Security Act 2002. 
67  Section 16 Public Order and Security Act 2002. 
68  Sokwanele 2004 www.sokwanele.com. 
69  Section 4A(1)(b) Zimbabwe Urban Councils' Act 2008; Anon 2010 www.zimbabwesituation.org 
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virtually never prohibited while others are regularly blocked.70 Ironically the numbers 
required to constitute a public gathering are nowhere specified, which leaves the 
police with the leeway to manipulate the law, with many people and organisations 
transposing the "two or more persons" mentioned in sections 17 and 19 to apply to 
public gatherings. Furthermore, a schedule to the Act exempts a list of "classes of 
public gathering to which section 24 does not apply". Those exempted from the 
obligation to notify the police include organisers of religious, educational or sporting 
events, weddings, funerals, and professional meetings, as well as gatherings of 
organisations "not of a political nature" and specifically, "registered trade unions 
when meeting for bona fide trade union purposes".71 
 
Cumulatively these sections (17-24)72 have been used to decline or shut down 
several public meetings, including those held by elected MDC officials to report to 
their constituencies. The police are not required to give reasons why meetings are 
considered threats to public order nor do they suggest conditions under which the 
meetings could be held, a recent example being the abortive campaign rally of the 
MDC which was denied by the partisan police on the pretext that the same venue 
had been booked by ZANU PF.73 Upon further inquiry it was discovered that ZANU 
PF neither held nor had booked the venue.74 The Act gives the police arbitrary 
powers such as the authority to change the venue or other logistical aspects of a 
meeting, prohibit the meeting entirely, or prohibit all public meetings in a particular 
police district for up to three months. In practice the police do not sanction any 
meeting presumed to threaten public order, the organisers being referred to Section 
19, which discourages "gatherings conducive to riot, disorder or intolerance". Section 
32 of POSA empowers the police to cordon off areas and search individuals and 
residences, to stop people in public places at random, to search them and to 
demand the production of identity documents. Those that are found without 
documents could be detained. Section 25(5) authorises the Attorney-General to 
prosecute those suspected of having breached any section of POSA and calls upon 
                                                          
70  Anon 2010 www.zimbabwesituation.org. 
71  Anon 2010 www.zimbabwesituation.org. 
72  Anon 2010 www.zimbabwesituation.org. 
73  Shumba 2010 www.swradioafrica.com. 
74  Karimakwenda 2011 www.swradioafrica.com; Ndou 2011 bulawayo24.com; Matenga 2011 
www.newsday.co.zw.  
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the defence forces to assist the police when the need arises. It also gives the police 
powers of search, seizure and forfeiture, notable examples being the seizure of radio 
equipment as happened in the Capitol and Bulawayo Dialogue, two radio stations 
that had initially been licensed to broadcast.75 In the face of this legislation, many 
civic organisations and opposition political parties have found it very difficult to reach 
out to their constituencies without committing a breach of one of the sections of 
POSA. The freedoms of speech, movement and association have also been 
curtailed notably by sections 15-19 of POSA. This has made the work of much of 
civil society difficult as activists come under scrutiny in the context of POSA and 
AIPPA.76 Some sections of civil society,77 notably the ZCTU and the MDC, have 
been affected by the restrictions of POSA, as they frequently attempt to hold 
meetings with their members.  
 
2.6  Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (2005) (AIPPA) 
 
Enacted during the same period, POSA and AIPPA complement each other to 
further entrench ZANU PF and curtail voices of dissent. AIPPA aims to control the 
free flow of information as the government has been empowered to determine what 
type of information eventually reaches citizens. Media freedom and independent 
newspapers have been under threat as many of their staff have been arraigned 
before the courts of law for publishing what the state views as prejudicial to state 
security, which under sections 23-30 of AIPPA is a criminal offence. The selective 
application of sections of AIPPA to intimidate the independent media has resulted in 
the development of suspicion between the state and the independent media, with 
The Daily News being bombed and eventually closed in 2003. The closure on 12 
September 2003 of Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ), publishers of The 
Daily News and The Daily News on Sunday, ranks as AIPPA's severest blow against 
the freedom of the press in Zimbabwe.78 Consequently access to information as a 
human right has been violated in these and numerous other occasions. Zimbabwe 
silently witnessed a major assault on human rights as courts of law were used to 
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silence or shoot down any legal challenges against certain sections of the law, 
insofar as these promote or restrict the freedoms of expression, movement and 
association. The Supreme Court dismissed ANZ's (the publishers of the Daily News) 
application challenging the constitutionality of certain sections of the Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). The application was dismissed on 
the basis of the "Clean Hands" doctrine, in that the company had failed to comply 
with the Act that requires all newspaper companies to be registered by the Media 
and Information Commission (MIC). That decision is remarkable because it 
represents a major setback to the protection and enjoyment of human rights in 
Zimbabwe. With all due respect the Supreme Court (the Court) may have erred in its 
reliance on the controversial "Clean Hands" doctrine in a matter involving 
fundamental constitutional rights.79 Magaisa (2003) concludes that the decision 
marks a dangerous precedent in human rights jurisprudence in Zimbabwe.80 
 
Countries "which are committed to democratic good governance should adopt a legal 
regime that promotes access to information".81 Access to information is "the ability of 
the citizen to obtain information in the possession of the state."82 AIPPA is a legal 
instrument that enables the government to monitor and control the flow of 
information in the country. In enacting the legislation, the government argued that it 
wanted to prevent the publication of information that is "manufactured and can be 
manipulated into a lethal weapon for our downfall".83 Under sections 38, 39 and 42 
the Act prohibits the publication of unverified stories and is empowered to register 
and deregister journalists or deny them a licence to practise without giving reasons. 
This implies that journalists can be co-opted or taken advantage of in order to retain 
their licences, in contravention of the ethics of their profession. These ethics are 
further compromised in that the government can determine what should be reported 
and what should not. Prohibitive punishment for the breach of these laws has seen 
many journalists getting arrested and independent newspapers closed down, as in 
the case of The Daily News, which was closed in 2004 after it was accused of 
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reporting in favour of anti-government forces.84 The government has also taken 
advantage of AIPPA to deny prospective independent newspapers and radio stations 
licenses to practise, arguing that "the local media should not be owned by 
foreigners".85 This is in breach of citizens' right to information, which according to 
Section 20 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (guaranteeing access to information and 
freedom of expression) "every citizen has a right to information". AIPPA has also 
adversely affected relationships with other countries because it prohibits foreign 
diplomats from making speeches at their National Day events. Section 79(4) 
prohibits foreign diplomats from making political statements unless such statements 
support the status quo or the existing political dispensation. Section 90 of AIPPA 
makes the practice of journalism without accreditation a criminal offence punishable 
by up to two years in prison. Civic organisations are also not allowed to be involved 
in the politics of the country or to make political statements or to leak any information 
outside the country. Civic organisations are also not allowed to be involved in the 
politics of the country, to make political statements, or to leak any information outside 
the country.86 
 
Under AIPPA, practising journalism should be by registration under the Media and 
Information Council (MIC), which gives or denies licences to both journalists and 
media stations alike. It also licenses or refuses to license radio stations. Under MIC 
many prospective radio stations have been denied the chance to operate. Journalists 
operating without licenses are subject to heavy fines and/or imprisonment. These 
restrictions on journalism also apply to non-journalists collecting information for 
private purposes.87  
 
2.7  Interception of Communications Act (2007) 
 
The Act seeks to "establish an interception of communication monitoring centre 
whose function shall be to monitor and intercept certain communications in the 
course of their transmission through a telecommunication, postal or any other related 
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services system". Through the Interception of Communications Act88 the government 
strives to regulate the interception of communications through constitutional 
provisions protecting the privacy of communications, and requisite laws and 
regulations to implement the constitutional requirements regards the Act with 
apprehension. The Act violates the human rights of Zimbabweans and many 
international Conventions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), which states: "No one should be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, or to attacks on his integrity or 
reputation”89 and that “Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interferences or attacks".90 Various civil society groups have rejected the 
Interception of Communications Act, citing its infringement on fundamental human 
rights and contravention of Section 20 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, which 
prescribes that every individual has a right to privacy.91  
 
2.8  The Broadcast Services Act (BSA) (2000) 
 
The world over, countries that are called democracies insist on the independence of 
the media, both in principle and in practice. Frequency allocation, the licensing of 
broadcasters and the technical administration of broadcasting are usually the 
prerogative of a broadcasting authority. Political control of broadcasting has always 
been regarded as an abridgment of the right to freedom of expression in any society 
that claims to be a democracy.92 Section 2 of Act 30 of 1990 – Amendment No. 11 of 
the Constitution of Zimbabwe - proclaims that it is a republic. The absolute or 
significant control of the broadcasting media by government has often resulted in the 
monopolisation of the media by government. The watershed elections of 1980, which 
resulted in ZANU PF's ascendance to power, were an exercise of the right to 
freedom of expression. Notwithstanding all its other weaknesses, Zimbabwe's 
Lancaster House Constitution contained a justifiable bill of rights. The right to 
express one's views and opinions without interference is vital to the nurturing and 
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growth of a sustainable democracy.93 It is a common acknowledgement that the 
freedom of information is a cornerstone upon which the very existence of a 
democratic society depends. The government has deemed it necessary to control 
information dissemination, an issue which was challenged by the Capital Radio 
(Private) Limited. In Zimbabwe, the electromagnetic transmission of audio and video 
signals and the available frequency spectrum are the preserve of the Zimbabwean 
Government, as prescribed by the Broadcasting Services Act (Chapter 12:01).94 
 
Until 2000 broadcasting in Zimbabwe was legally a State monopoly pursuant to 
section 27 of the Broadcasting Act 1957. Capital Radio sought to obtain a 
broadcasting licence and, as part of this process, challenged the State broadcasting 
monopoly before the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. In the Capital Radio judgment of 
22 September 2000 the Court held that the monopoly violated the constitutional right 
of freedom of expression by unduly limiting the public's right to receive and impart 
information.95 The Court lamented the fact that the parties had failed to agree on a 
regulatory framework for broadcasting and, in the light of this, ordered that the 
applicant be allowed to proceed to set up a broadcasting service. Capital Radio 
started broadcasting on 28 September 2000 but the government quickly responded 
by raiding its offices and closing it down.96 It promulgated the Presidential Powers 
(Temporary Provisions) Broadcasting Regulations, under the Presidential Powers 
(Temporary Measures) Act lasting for a duration of six months. These Regulations 
set up a framework for broadcast regulation, including the requirement that 
broadcasters be licensed, and establish a regulatory authority to undertake this task, 
the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ), under effective government control. 
Up until the present, no private broadcaster has been licensed under this 
legislation.97 
 
Capital Radio challenged the Act in a hearing before the Supreme Court in July 
2002. Judgment was rendered in the case only over a year later, on 19 September 
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2003. The Court, under a new Chief Justice since the 2000 broadcasting judgment 
had been rendered, struck down some of the more egregious provisions of the Act, 
including the following: 
 
 section 6, providing that the Minister, and not BAZ, should be the final 
licensing authority; 
 section 9(1), limiting to one the number of national free-to-air broadcasting 
services for each of radio and television; 
 section 9(2), providing that only one signal carrier licence could be issued; 
and 
 section 9(3), providing that only a public broadcaster could hold both a 
broadcasting and a signal carrier licence.98 
 
Until the judgment in the Capital Radio case it was a criminal offence for any person 
to broadcast both radio and television signals.99 The Supreme Court declared the 
exclusive broadcasting monopoly of the ZBC invalid. The Supreme Court declared 
that Capital Radio could begin to broadcast as the legislation entrenching Zimbabwe 
Broadcasting Corporation's monopoly was declared unconstitutional. Capital Radio 
and other persons with broadcasting equipment began radio broadcasts.100 But 
political control of broadcasting, which the Supreme Court had struck down in the 
Capital Radio case, was reintroduced through the Broadcasting Services Act.101 
Section 7.2 of the Broadcasting Services Act allows for the creation of a façade of 
liberalisation, yet cedes total control over all broadcasting to the government. The 
prevailing political and economic situation in Zimbabwe markedly affected the 
contents of the Broadcasting Services Act.102 Apart from the print media it is with 
electronic broadcasting, radio and television that in a modern society the right to 
freedom of expression is forcefully, collectively and purposefully exercised. The 
unlawful Radio Zimbabwe broadcast from Mozambique by ZANU PF was pivotal in 
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the party's electoral victory in 1980.103 It is rather ironic that the same government 
that ascended to power in part due to the influence of the media should be seen 
denying opposition political parties slots to campaign on radio and television. 
 
The constitution of the administration of the broadcasting authority is such that it 
shows the desire of the government to control the dissemination of information.104 
Section 4(2) of the ZBSA stipulates that all members of the Broadcasting Authority of 
Zimbabwe Board shall be appointed by the Minister after consultation with the 
President, and in accordance with any instructions that the President, which leaves 
the Minister of Information and the subsequent subordinates at the mercy of the 
President and/or his political party.The Minister himself is a presidential appointee, 
answerable, as are all Cabinet ministers, to the President. Further, the Minister's 
powers under the ZBSA are not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. 
Sections 8(1)(2)(5) make the Minister the sole licensing authority, with wide and 
arbitrary discretionary powers. Very restrictive conditions make it virtually impossible 
to invest in broadcasting.105 At law, the restrictive and cumulative powers of the 
Minister in terms of the Broadcasting Services Act and deliberate delays in issuing 
licences to prospective broadcasters, which delays have arisen as a result of those 
powers, indicate that the Minister's powers violate Section 20(1) of the Constitution. 
Additionally, sections 8(1)(2)(5), and 22(2) stipulate that a licence will be issued only 
to citizens ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe, which limits ownership to locals or 
residents. Also that no one should own more than 10% of the station. The licensing 
period is too short and according to Section 12(2) and (3) of the ZBSA, community 
licences last for one year only, which is a big discouragement for investors to put 
their work or funding into such a project. In South Africa community licences are 
issued for four years. The restrictions are further exacerbated by the fact that 
according to section 9(3) stations shall not transmit their own signals, nor are they 
allowed to own transmitters, masts, antennae etc. They have to send their signal to 
another company, which will then beam the signal on their behalf. This impinges on 
the potential broadcasters' and citizens' freedom to determine what type of 
information they want to broadcast or listen to.  
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Comparisons may be drawn with South Africa and Malawi.106 To its credit, the BSA 
makes no pretence that the licensing authority is independent. It has been stated 
that the licensing authority should be independent. A law creating a licensing 
authority susceptible to control and interference by the government falls foul of 
Section 20(1) of the Constitution. In the case of Zimbabwe, the licensing and 
regulatory authority is in a sense the government itself. There can be no suggestion 
therefore that the licensing and regulatory authority (the Minister of State for 
Information and Publicity in the President's office) is independent.107 
 
In South Africa community broadcasting licences are valid for four (4) years, 
television broadcasting licences for eight years, radio broadcasting licences for six 
years, a common signal carrier licence for fifteen years and a signal carrier licence 
given to a commercial broadcaster for eight years.108 The State President consults 
widely before appointing a Broadcasting Council. The President appoints members 
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of the Council on the advice of the National Assembly. Being the appointing 
authority, the President is empowered after due inquiry to remove a Councillor from 
office. There is a difference between the South African position and that obtaining in 
the Broadcasting Services Act in this regard. The President in South Africa has no 
unfettered discretion to appoint Council members. He may appoint members only 
from a short list of candidates who would have been interviewed by Parliament. The 
President is not at liberty to appoint party functionaries. In Zimbabwe the Minister 
almost single-handedly and in consultation with his superior, the President, 
determines the identity of the board members to appoint. In addition the Minister has 
the power to suspend and terminate the employment of the Board members.109 A 
very late entry to democratic practice, Malawi set up the Malawi Communications 
Regulatory Authority (MACRA). In section 4(3) the MACRA Act states "The Authority 
shall be independent in the performance of its functions".110 
 
In Zimbabwe the Broadcasting Services Act is glaringly unconstitutional. It appears 
that the purpose of the Act is not to regulate the transmission of radio and television 
signals but to control the information that is broadcast by independent broadcasting 
stations.111 The government still abuses the broadcasting facilities of the Zimbabwe 
Broadcasting Corporation, using the corporation as a propaganda tool for the ruling 
party. 
 
In an effort to facilitate citizen participation in the provision and promotion of relevant 
information and programmes, the SA Independent Broadcasting Authority Act112 has 
made provision for the establishment of the Broadcasting Complaints Commission 
(BCC). The BCC is an avenue given to the public for their input. In South Africa local 
content is not legislated in terms of an Act of parliament. The Independent 
Broadcasting Authority Act states that the regulator shall set local content quotas. In 
practice, and in terms of regulations promulgated, most private broadcasters are 
required to carry at least 20% South African content and are given two years to 
implement this quota. Subscription television is usually required to carry 15% South 
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African local content and public television 50%. France is a country well known in 
Europe for its strict policy on French local content quotas113. It limits television 
broadcasting to 40% French material and 60% European material. The local content 
requirements are very restrictive and prevent investment. In Zimbabwe, the existing 
legislation has pegged local content at 75% for both television and radio, and plans 
are under way to put local content at 100%. Local content requirements must not be 
pedantic. It seems rather obvious that the government is aware of the pathetic state 
of the broadcasting industry and that the mandatory requirements are deliberately 
aimed at ensuring that very few companies invest in broadcasting. Yet ironically, 
Zimbabwe is a county that is desperately in need of investment. 
 
The above critique of the Zimbabwean Broadcasting Services Act seeks to show that 
the Broadcasting Services Act: 
*  is inherently unconstitutional, violating sections 20 and 16 of the constitution 
of Zimbabwe, which guarantee the rights to freedom of expression and private 
property respectively; 
*  places absolute and discretionary power upon the Minister; 
*  prevents all nature and forms of investment in the broadcasting sector; and  
*  in bad faith creates an absolutely useless and irrelevant Broadcasting 
Authority.114 
 
2.9  Electoral legislation115 
 
Electoral legislation in Zimbabwe is categorised as operational and institutional. 
Institutional legislation provides for the creation of institutions that conduct elections. 
Operational legislation provides for the modus operandi of elections in the country. 
The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission would represent the institutional framework 
while the Electoral Court would be an example of the institutional aspect of elections 
in the country. Although these legal provisions have sought to create an atmosphere 
for the conduct of free, fair and credible elections, the politicisation and militarisation 
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of the electoral process by ZANU PF has led to the conduct of disgraceful elections 
that produced disputed results. Pursuant to the ECA, two complementary electoral 
laws were passed during the last quarter of 2004, the Electoral Act and the 
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act (ZECA). The Electoral Act is the overall law 
that governs the conduct of elections in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission Act created the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), which is in 
charge of preparing for and conducting House of Assembly (formerly parliamentary), 
senatorial, presidential, and council elections, as well as referenda, as provided for in 
the Electoral Act.116 
 
2.9.1  The Electoral Commission Act (ECA) 
 
The primary purpose of the ECA has been to ensure that elections "are conducted 
efficiently, freely, fairly, transparently and in accordance with the law", which is a 
responsibility conferred upon ZEC by section 61(4)(1) of the Constitution. 
Established as a result of a Constitutional Amendment in 2005 (2) it consists of a 
chairman and six other members (Section 61(1) of the Constitution). The chairman 
must either be a judge or a person qualified for appointment as a judge (Section 
61(1)(a) of the Constitution). The appointment of the chairman is made by the 
President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission (JSC).117 The 
recommendation of the JSC is not binding on the President who must, however, 
inform the Senate if he appoints someone other than the person recommended by 
the JSC (Section 61(1)(b) of the Constitution). The six other members – of whom at 
least three must be women – are also appointed by the President.118 However, his 
discretion is limited – at least in a formal sense – by the requirement that he must 
choose from a list of nine nominees submitted by the Parliamentary Committee on 
Standing Rules and Orders.119  
 
2.9.2  Zimbabwe Electoral Act (2006) 
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The Act provides a window of opportunity to the electorate to exercise their right to 
vote. All this has tended to put the Zimbabwean electoral process into the limelight. 
The paper therefore intends to establish whether the electoral system can conduct a 
free and fair electoral process. This paper will also seek to establish the extent to 
which it abides by the dictates of the SADC Guidelines on the Conduct of 
Democratic Elections,120 a set of guidelines that all SADC member states should 
follow when conducting elections.121 
 
The Zimbabwean Electoral Act has been at the centre of all the disputed elections 
over the years.122 ZANU PF has militarised and politicised the electoral process, 
giving it the leeway to rig the results, to buy votes, and to manipulate the electorate 
by politicizing food aid to rural communities.123 The continued abuses of the 
Emergency Powers Act has continued, a development which has tended to erode 
the independence of the Judiciary as well as the doctrine of the separation of powers 
as enshrined in the Constitution of Zimbabwe. But its edicts are often ignored (for 
instance, the High Court order instructing ex-combatants to vacate commercial farms 
has been challenged by both the government and the Attorney-General (Zimbabwe 
Independent, March 24, 2000)); the tendency of government to ignore criticism and 
negotiate only with politically useful groups; and the placing of the ruling party's 
political survival above national economic survival. All of these elements are familiar 
from the days of the Rhodesian Front regime.124 Even the Electoral Court, which had 
been staffed with ZANU PF operatives and functionaries, was not spared from 
manipulation, with numerous unsuccessful attempts by political parties failing to 
secure any verdict on their appeal for a recount of votes.125 This tendency by 
government to ignore court rulings was equally applied by the ZANU PF government 
when it came to election petitions by other political parties, notably the MDC, which 
has in numerous cases challenged electoral results in court. The Constitution of 
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Zimbabwe specifically gives citizens the right to approach the court to challenge the 
legislation, but this legal provision has been applied selectively in favour of ZANU 
PF, leading to despondency among the agrieved parties. Without the help of the 
court the citizens have been left at the mercy of the party with a parliamentary 
majority, in this case ZANU PF, over the years from 1980 up to 2007. This 
manipulation of legislative loopholes by ZANU PF has tended to effectively close the 
door to challenges against the law.126 
 
This has rendered the whole electoral process not only prone to manipulation but 
flawed, thereby eventually short-changing the electorate. The Zimbabwe Electoral 
Act (2004) is a constitutional provision that provides guidelines on the conduct of 
elections at national, provincial and municipal levels alike. The Act provides for the 
creation of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, whose mandate is to conduct 
elections. This Act establishes an independent authority, the Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission, to administer all elections and referenda in Zimbabwe. The Act 
empowers the State President to appoint members of the Commission. It administers 
Presidential, Parliamentary, Senatorial and Municipal elections.127 
 
The provisions give the Commission far-reaching powers over voter education. The 
Act also bars all foreign support for voter education activities except through the 
Electoral Commission. Under the Act, the Commission would be empowered to 
require anyone other than a political party providing voter education to furnish it with 
detailed information, including its funding sources.128 Failure to comply with any one 
of these laws would constitute a criminal offence liable to a fine or to up to two years 
of imprisonment. Much of civil society and many NGOs depend on foreign funding. 
Civil society has therefore tended to view the Electoral Act as government's attempt 
to flush them out of existence and to cause cash-flow problems for civic groups. A 
free election is one in which voters can freely vote for the candidates of their choice. 
The electoral laws themselves must create a set of rules that allow all contesting 
parties to compete fairly in the elections and all eligible voters who wish to do so to 
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exercise their right to vote.129 A fair election is one in which all of the processes of 
the election are fairly and impartially administered. These processes include the 
registration of voters and election candidates, the voting process, and the counting of 
votes and the announcement of the results. Election candidates and parties 
contesting the election must also be given a fair and substantially equal opportunity 
before the election to campaign and inform the electorate of their principles, policies 
and promises. This includes equal opportunity for airtime in the electronic and print 
media.130 
 
2.9.3  Electoral Court 
 
Linnington (2010:110) provides a discussion on the role of the Electoral Court in 
Zimbabwe's electoral processes and its envisaged propensity to deal with electoral 
disputes in the country. The Electoral Act established an Electoral Court "for the 
purpose of hearing and determining election petitions and other matters in terms of 
this Act."131 The court has no jurisdiction in criminal cases.132 Judges of the Electoral 
Court are the same recycled High Court judges who are appointed by the Chief 
Justice "after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission and the Judge 
President of the High Court."133 Previously the Electoral Act did not involve the 
Judicial Service Commission in the appointment process, which makes such 
appointments unconstitutional since the system was not consistent with section 92(1) 
of the Constitution.134 That provision says: 
 
The power to appoint persons to preside over a special court shall vest in the 
President, after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission: provided that 
Parliament may provide that the Chief Justice may, after consulting the Judicial 
Service Commission, appoint a person holding the office of Judge of the High Court 
to preside over a special court for such a period as he may specify.135 
 
                                                          
129  World Bank Governance 4. 
130  World Bank Governance 4. 
131  Section 161(1) Zimbabwe Electoral Act 2006. 
132  Section 161(2) Zimbabwe Electoral Act 2006. 
133  Section 1161(1) Zimbabwe Electoral Act 2006. 
134  Section 16 Public Order and Security Act 2002. 
135  Section 16 Public Order and Security Act 2002. 
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One might want to question the speciality of the "special court". According to section 
92(4) of the Constitution, there are three types of special courts, namely The 
Magistrate's Court, The High Court and The Supreme Court.136 The Electoral Court 
does not fall within the scope of these types.137 That leaves only those courts or 
other adjudicating authorities that qualify as special courts, because there is no right 
of appeal from their decisions to the Supreme or High Courts.138 Decisions of the 
Electoral Court on questions of fact are final,139 but questions of law may be 
appealed to the Supreme Court140 and must be determined within six months.141 
Because appeals on points of law are permissible, the question arises as to whether 




Prior to the March 2008 elections, the Government of Zimbabwe had taken 
advantage of its mandate and parliamentary majority to enact laws that restrict and 
curtail citizens' participation in strengthening public policy. Amendments to existing 
laws had been vindictive and tended to dis-empower citizens from partaking in 
matters of public interest. The employment of laws to repress the citizenry has seen 
the government breaching and reneging on its obligations to serve the populace. 
However, recent development where the opposition has assumed a parliamentary 
majority have created a tense situation where the establishment does not want to 
relinquish power, with talk of a government of national unity becoming prevalent in 
political circles. Generally, the behaviour of the ZANU (PF) regime has been a slap 
in the face of democracy and all democratic and proactive forces. The results of the 
run-off elections have indicated that the ruling party has the audacity and capability 
to manipulate the electoral process for its advantage. The only problem that ZANU 
(PF) will have with its "electoral victory" is the recognition of its Presidency by pro-
democratic forces in Zimbabwe, civil society and the regional and international 
                                                          
136  Paragraphs (a) and (c) of s 92(4) Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1979. 
137  Paragraphs (a) and (c) of s 92(4) Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1979. 
138  Section 92(4)(b) Zimbabwe Electoral Act 2006. 
139  Section 172(1) Zimbabwe Electoral Act 2006. 
140  Section 172 (2) Zimbabwe Electoral Act 2006. 
141  Section 172(3) Zimbabwe Electoral Act 2006. 
142  Section 16 Public Order and Security Act 2002. 
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community. This explains why the ZANU (PF) has set the recognition of Mugabe as 
the winner of the run-off elections and therefore the President of Zimbabwe as a 
condition for talks on the formation of Government of a National Unity. 
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